The present paper demonstrates the failure of the principle of excluded middle (PEM) in the lattice of all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (that is usually defined as quantum logic). Namely, it is shown that for a qubit, a proposition and its negation can be both false. Since PEM is the assumed theorem of quantum logic, this raises the question: If PEM holds in the orthocomplemented lattice of all propositions of the quantum system, then how the failure of PEM in quantum logic can be explained? Alternatively, if the propositions relating to the quantum system do not obey PEM, then what is the semantics of those propositions? Possible answers to these questions are analyzed in the present paper.
Introduction and preliminaries
Recall that a qubit is a two-state quantum-mechanical system. Correspondingly, any pure qubit state |Ψ (Q) n / ∈ {0} (where {0} is the zero-vector space containing only vector 0) can be represented as a linear superposition of two states |Ψ 
where n ∈ {1, 2}, Q, R ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and c 1 , c 2 ∈ C. The states |Ψ (−1) a (−δ b1 + iδ b2 ) (−1) a (−δ b1 − iδ b2 ) 1 + (−1) a δ b3 .
The column spaces (a.k.a. images and ranges) of the operatorsP 
Dually, ran(1 −P (Q) n ) = ker(P (Q) n ) stands for the null space (a.k.a. kernel) of the projectorP
n , i.e., the subset of the vectors |Ψ ∈ H that are mapped to zero byP (Q) n , namely,
where1 denotes the identity operator. For that reason, the projector1 −P (Q) n can be understood as the negation ofP (Q) n , i.e.,
It results from the formula (2) thatP
for any Q. Hence, in the two-dimensional Hilbert space H = C 2 one has
Consistent with the assumption of Birkhoff and von Neumann [1] , the set of all the closed linear subspaces of C 2 , namely,
1 ), ran(P
2 ), . . . , ran(P
2 ), ran(1) ,
where ran(0) = {0} and ran(1) = C 2 , form a complete lattice called the Hilbert lattice (L(C 2 ), ≤) where the symbol ≤ denotes the partial ordering on L(C 2 ). This partial ordering is defined by
Because (L(C 2 ), ≤) is complete, it has join and meet operations denoted ∨ and ∧ [2, 3] . Particularly, for each pair of elements ran(P (Q) n ) and ran(P
m ) and m ∈ {1, 2}, one has
where (·) ⊥ stands for the orthogonal complement of (·).
Let the qubit be prepared in the pure state given by the vector |Ψ residing in the closed linear subspace H p ∈ L(C 2 ). Then, the logical proposition P (Q) n asserting that this vector lies in the range of the projection operatorP (Q) n on C 2 can be set forth by
where
n ) stands for the meet operation on the closed linear subspaces H p and ran(P
In a dual manner, the proposition asserting that this vector lies in the kernel of the projection operatorP (Q) n can be defined as the negation ¬P (Q) n of the proposition P (Q) n and set forth by
n+(−1) n−1 ) is the meet of H |Ψ and ran(P (Q)
In line with these definitions, if the qubit is prepared in the state |Ψ (R) m / ∈ {0} belonging to either the range ran(P (R) 1 ) or the range ran(P (R) 2 ), the proposition P (R) 1 and its negation ¬P
As |Ψ (R) m / ∈ {0}, the proposition Prop |Ψ (R) m ∈ {0} must be a contradiction, which means that
and ¬P
cannot be false together.
However, if the qubit is prepared in the superposition of the states |Ψ shown in (1), i.e., in the state |Ψ (Q) n / ∈ {0} located in the subspace ran(P (Q) n ), then the proposition P (R) 1 and its negation ¬P (R) 1 are both false:
This is confusing because the principle of excluded middle (PEM for short), which states that a proposition and its negation cannot be false together [4] , is supposed to hold in the lattice (L(H), ≤) -i.e., the lattice of all the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H -usually defined as quantum logic [5, 6] .
Assuming after [7] that there is an isomorphism between the lattice of quantum propositions Qi.e., the orthocomplemented lattice of all propositions of a quantum mechanical system -and the lattice (L(H), ≤), this raises the question: If PEM holds in Q, then how the failure of PEM in (L(H), ≤) demonstrated in (17) and (18) can be explained?
Alternatively, if quantum propositions do not obey PEM, then what is the semantics of those propositions?
The present paper analyzes possible answers to these questions.
Intuitionistic quantum logic
Let us start with the analysis of the statement that quantum propositions reject PEM.
From a mathematical point of view, to interpret quantum propositions in terms of the intuitionistic propositional logic (in which PEM is not valid), one must find mathematical objects in quantum theory that form the structure of a Heyting algebra, i.e., a semantic of intuitionistic propositional logic.
Recall that the pseudo-complement ¬a of an element a of the Heyting algebra H is the supremum of the set {b : b ∧ a = 0} such that b ∈ H and a belongs to this set, i.e., a ∧ ¬a = 0 holds [8] .
Suppose that the elements of the partially ordered set L(C 2 ) are also elements of the Heyting algebra H, i.e., the bounded lattice with join and meet operations ∨ and ∧ and with least element {0} (denoted by 0) and greatest element C 2 (denoted by 1).
The subset S has a single upper bound which is greatest element C 2 . To be sure, for any pair of ranges ran(P (Q) n ) and ran(P
n ) and
m ), at the same time as ran(P (Q) n ) and ran(P (R) m ) are incomparable with each other. This means that any set
does not contain a minimal element, i.e., a pseudo-complement. Hence, the closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space C 2 cannot form a pseudo-complemented lattice and, as a result, an acceptable Heyting algebra H.
Still, there is a possibility to replace the Hilbert lattice (L(C 2 ), ≤) with some other (distributive) lattice that defines a Heyting algebra.
For example, in the paper [9] , as a replacement of (L(C 2 ), ≤), the lattice O(G 2 ) is suggested whose elements are functions from the partially ordered set C(C 2 ) of all unital commutative sub-C * -algebras C of C 2 to the poset L(C 2 ). As the result of this, instead of being associated with a single closed subspace of C 2 , a proposition corresponds to a family of the subspaces, one family per classical context. The suggested lattice O(G 2 ) is the topology of the quantum phase space G 2 , and as such defines a Heyting algebra.
Be this as it may, it should, however, be noted that the motivation for any alternative lattice is somewhat weaker than the motivation for the Hilbert lattice.
Furthermore, while in quantum logic, the assignment of truth-values to the elements of the Hilbert lattice takes the values from a set like {0, 1} which is identified with false and true, in the intuitionistic quantum logic proposed in [9] , the truth assignment on O(G 2 ) is required to take values from some general and abstract "truth object" (like a topos) whose semantical interpretation is not that clear.
Supervaluational quantum logic
Now, let us analyze the statement that quantum propositions obey PEM.
We will start with the observation made in [10] : Let A and B be the verifiable propositions relating to the quantum-mechanical system. The proposition is called actual for a particular realization of the system (where by particular realization one can understand the quantum state |Ψ in which the system is prepared) if this proposition has a definite truth value. According to [10] , actuality of A ∨ B does not necessarily imply actuality of A or actuality of B, i.e., there exists a state (a superposition of states) for which A ∨ B is actual, but neither A nor B are actual.
This observation speaks in favor of supervaluationism. Let us briefly recall some definitions regarding supervaluationism needed in this paper.
In a word, supervaluationism is a semantics that allows one to apply the tautologies of propositional logic in cases where truth values are undefined [11] .
Supervaluationism retains the classical consequence relation and classical laws whilst admitting truth-value gaps (meaning that some propositions have absolutely no truth-value). Accordingly, a disjunction as well as a conjunction may have a definite truth value even when its components do not [12] .
For example, given that the concept of a heap lacks sharp boundaries, the proposition "N grain(s) of wheat is a heap" cannot have a truth-value since no one grain of wheat can be identified as making the difference between being a heap and not being a heap.
However, it is logically true for any number of grains of wheat that it either does or does not make a heap. In other words, the disjunction of the propositions P = "N grain(s) of wheat is a heap" and ¬P = "N grain(s) of wheat is not a heap" is an instance of the valid schema P ∨ ¬P and so, according to supervaluationism, it should be true regardless of whether or not its disjuncts have a truth value; that is, it should be true in all interpretations (in the given example, for any number of grains N ). As a consequence, supervaluation semantics is no longer truth-functional.
If, in general, something is true in all interpretations, supervaluationism describes it as "supertrue", while something false in all interpretations is described as "superfalse" [13] .
From a mathematical point of view, to interpret quantum propositions in terms of a supervaluationary logic, one must impose upon the closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space a structure that allows truth-value gaps. The collection of invariant-subspace lattices that have no mutual nontrivial members provides a natural candidate for such a structure.
Particularly, to form this "gappy" structure, it is enough to strengthen the assumption of the Hilbert lattice (L(C 2 ), ≤). That is, the logical predicate of the assumption of the Hilbert lattice
i.e., the rule defining the set L(C 2 ) of all the closed linear subspaces H ′ of the Hilbert space C 2 using set-builder notation
should be replaced by a stronger predicate, namely
As per this strengthened rule, each partially ordered set
can include only those closed linear subspaces H ′ that are invariant under the projection operator P (R) m . That is, the image of every vector |Ψ in those H ′ underP (R) m remains within H ′ which can be denoted asP
The elements of every set L(P
form the invariant-subspace lattice (L(P (R) m ), ≤), a complete complemented distributive lattice (a Boolean algebra) [14] . As it is obvious, each set L(P 
where the cancelation of ∧ indicates that this operation cannot be defined.
The nonexistence of the meet operation for pairs of the ranges that do not lie in a common invariantsubspace lattice corresponds to truth-value gaps in the supervaluational logic.
To be sure, consider the proposition P 
As the operation ✟ ✟ ∧ is undefined, the proposition P (to borrow the terminology from the paper [10] , they are not actual in this state), that is,
where b stands for the bivalent valuation relation, i.e., the function from the set of propositions into the set {0, 1} of bivalent truth values, and 0 0 denotes an indeterminate value.
In contrast to this, the propositions
have a defined truth-value because
are the trivial elements of every invariant-subspace lattice and, hence, can meet the subspace ran(P (Q) n ). In symbols,
the propositions (32) and (33) are, in terms of supervaluationism, supertrue and superfalse, correspondingly.
On the other hand, seeing as the ranges ran(P m ), ≤), one can maintain a classical logical interpretation of the meet and join of these subspaces and consequently present
Therefore, even though the proposition P In this sense, the supervaluational semantics of quantum propositions does not violate the classical principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction (according to which a proposition and its negation cannot be both true [4] ).
Many-valued quantum logic
One may say that "gappy" propositions like (28) and (29) have no truth value for the reason that they do not belong to the domain of two-valued logic. Therefore, one may assign to "gappy" propositions a new -i.e., different from true and false -truth-value (called, for example, "undetermined") and assume that the image of this new truth-value under the valuation relation lies between 0 and 1. By doing so, one can construct a many-valued semantics of quantum propositions which defines the same logic as the supervaluational semantics does.
For example, in the infinite-valued semantics of quantum propositions proposed in a series of works [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] , the valuation v (i.e., the function from the set of propositions into the interval [0, 1] of the infinite-valued truth degrees) is set forth by
As it can be readily seen from here, if the realization of the qubit is given by the state |Ψ 
In this way, what is regarded as truth-value gaps in the supervaluational semantics is filled out with the truth degrees lying between 0 and 1 in the many-valued semantics.
However, the many-valued semantics exhibits a problem pertaining to the interpretation of the truth degrees. To illustrate this problem, suppose that the gaps b(P The difficulty with this question is that there does not exist a standard interpretation of the truth degrees and, therefore, how the difference Ψ
is to be understood depends on the chosen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Thus, in Quantum Bayesianism, i.e., the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics [20, 21] , the said difference represents the inequality in the degrees of belief of an agent regarding the proposition P (R) 1 and its negation. Whereas, under the Copenhagen interpretation, the same difference may be understood as the contrast in the degrees to which the qubit possesses and does not possess the property P (R) 1 before its verification.
Counterfactual definiteness of quantum logic
From what is argued in the Section 3, it follows that the failure of PEM demonstrated in (17) and (18) is caused by the "gapless" structure of the Hilbert lattice (L(C 2 ), ≤).
Given Σ, the collection of all the nontrivial projection operators on C 2 , namely,
the assumption of the Hilbert lattice is formally equivalent to the statement that for the collection of L(P
or, explicitly, {0}, ran(P
2 ),
This statement brings on the meet operation on any pairs of the closed subspaces of C 2 , i.e.,
thus implying that a proposition and its negation may be both false.
Semantically, though, the statement (46) is consistent with the assumption of counterfactual definiteness.
Recall that counterfactual definiteness is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed [22] . Equally, this term can be used to imply the ability to assign a definite truth value to a proposition that has not yet been verified.
Along the lines of counterfactual definiteness, the existence of the meet operation on the column spaces of the incommutable projection operatorsP In this way, the "gappy" lattice structure of the supervaluationary logic of quantum propositions rejects counterfactual definiteness inasmuch as a truth value of the proposition Prop |Ψ ∈ ran(P (Q) n )✚ ∧ ran(P (R) 1 ) cannot be defined.
Concluding remarks
Being omnipresent in classical logic, the principle of excluded middle plays an important role in the issue of macroscopic realism [23] .
In terms of Schrodinger's cat gedanken experiment [24] (where the premise is that the macroscopically distinguishable states "dead" and "alive" are the quantum states of the "cat"), given that after the verification of its status, the cat can be only found in one of the two quantum stateseither dead or alive -macroscopic realism asserts that the cat is always is in one of these states, even before the verification. As a consequence, the proposition P = "the cat is dead" and its negation ¬P = "the cat is alive" cannot be both false not only after the verification but also prior to the verification. Hence, macroscopic realism implies that the quantum propositions obey PEM.
Typically, to negate macroscopic realism, the rejection of PEM is considered and, consequently, an intuitionistic approach to quantum logic is sought (see, e.g., [9] ). However, as it has been shown in this paper, supervaluational quantum logic refutes macroscopic realism as well.
To be sure, according to the supervaluationist account of Schrodinger's cat gedanken experiment, when the cat is in the superposition state, the disjunction P ∨ ¬P and conjunction P ∧ ¬P are true and false, correspondingly, but neither P nor ¬P is actual. That is, the statement "Out of two possible states, dead and alive, the cat is in one or the other but not in both" is true despite the fact the statement "The cat is in one of these states" has absolutely no truth-value before the verification.
